Arthrex: Supreme Court Upholds PTAB Judges

Maier & Maier

After facing extreme uncertainty at the Federal Circuit, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“PTAB”) judges have avoided calamity as the Supreme Court upheld their appointment process as constitutional in Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew. In their final decision, the Court held that while their appointment was upheld, the review process for their decisions was not and remanded the case down to the acting USPTO Director for further consideration.

The case began in an inter partes review proceeding at the PTAB and was appealed to the Federal Circuit on the basis that the Administrative Patent Judges comprising the Board are principal officers, who need Presidential appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate. This was premised on the lack of review their decisions receive from the USPTO Director, who is a duly appointed principal officer. According to 35 U. S. C. §6(c), “only the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may grant rehearings”. By insolating the APJs from Director’s review, Arthrex argued that they were converted to principal officers and their appointment was unconstitutional.

At the Federal Circuit, the panel agreed. Because the review process vested the APJ’s with power that exceeded that of an inferior officer, their appointment by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement. To cure this, the Federal Circuit declared that the tenure provision of the APJ’s was unconstitutional. This allowed the USPTO Director to fire them at their discretion and imbued the Director with a form of review over their processes. By giving the Director this authority, the Federal Circuit believed the APJ’s were satisfactorily inferior officers and their appointment could be upheld.

After the denied en banc rehearing, the Supreme Court disagreed in a splintered decision by the Justices. The opinion of the Court was authored by Justice Roberts and joined for Parts I and II by Justices Gorsuch, Alito, Barrett, and Kavanaugh. The crux of the decision rests on the review process itself being unconstitutional and curing it by remanding the case to the Director for their constitutionally mandated authority to review. As the Court explains, the statute “is unenforceable as applied to the Director insofar as it prevents the Director from reviewing the decisions of the PTAB on his own. The Director may engage in such review and reach his own decision.”

By striking the limitation on the Director, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the PTAB and its proceedings and prevented what could have been an extreme period of uncertainty for patent owners with the review process in total flux.

If you have any questions or concerns about how this or any other recent news may affect your portfolio or interests, please reach out to one of our attorneys here.

PTAB Designates 5 Decisions as Informative

Maier & Maier

The PTAB has designated five new decisions as informative, three on IPR practice procedure and two ex parte decisions (one on issue preclusion and one on claim construction):

Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation Ltd., IPR2012-00022, Paper 55 (PTAB Aug. 7, 2013)

Here the Board provides guidance on foreign depositions, both on the location where they are taken and the language in which they are conducted. The Board emphasizes that “the parties are in the best position to determine the procedure by which the deposition is to be conducted” but provides 12 general guidelines for procedures to use for depositions in foreign languages covering such topics as 1). each sides’ right to bring an interpreter, 2). protocol for resolving disagreements between interpreters on their respective interpretations, and 3). notice requirements on documents which will be “sight read” at the deposition. The full list is available in the decision linked above.

Ex parte Jung, 2016-008290 (PTAB Mar. 22, 2017)

In this appeal, the appellant challenged the examiner’s interpretation that the claim language “at least one of a connection branch and a contents connection list” required only ‘a connection branch’ OR ‘a contents connection list’ as opposed to requiring both of their presence. In their reversal, the Board applied the ruling from the Federal Circuit in SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., which explained that the plain meaning of ‘at least one of A and B’ is the conjunctive phrase ‘at least one of A and at least one of B.”[1] The Board explained that the plain meaning could have been rebutted with a demonstration that the other claims, specification, or the prosecution history necessitated a broader interpretation, but, absent such a showing, the examiner erred.

Argentum Pharm. LLC v. Alcon Research, Ltd., IPR2017-01053, Paper 27 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2018)

In this decision, the Board offers an analysis on the ‘good cause’ standard for protective orders.  The Board denied a motion for a protective order without prejudice for failure to demonstrate that “(1) the information sought to be sealed is truly confidential, (2) a concrete harm would result upon public disclosure, (3) there exists a genuine need to rely in the trial on the specific information sought to be sealed, and (4), on balance, an interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record.”[2]

Colas Sols. Inc. v. Blacklidge Emulsions, Inc., IPR2018-00242, Paper 9 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2018)

The decision here applies to § 315 bars to institution in IPRs. Specifically, the Board found institution was barred when a petitioner has previously filed for a declaratory judgment of invalidity on the same patent.  Furthermore, the Board ruled that a motion for joinder could not save a petitioner from the statutory bar under § 315(a)(1). In its reasoning, the Board explains that while a § 315(b) time bar is specifically excluded in instances of joinder under § 315 (c), the statutory bar for § 315(a)(1) provides for no such exemption.

Ex parte Ditzik, 2018-000087 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2018)

Here, the Board upheld an examiner’s use of issue preclusion from a related invalidity finding against the applicant in District Court. In so doing, the Board found the following arguments by the appealing applicant accurate, but unpersuasive with respect to issue preclusion: 1). The fact that the claims are not the same in the proceedings; 2). The procedural possibility for the District Court ruling to be overturned; and 3). The PTO’s absence as a party from the District Court proceeding. While the Board did not find any of the following in this case, it allowed for potential rebuttals to issue preclusion when 1). The standard applied in the prior final decision might have caused a different outcome than before the Board; 2). Evidence available now was demonstrated to not be available at the time of the prior proceeding; or 3). There was otherwise not a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ in the prior proceeding and the Board wishes to exercise its discretion despite the motivations of efficiency and consistency for issue preclusion.

Each decision is linked in the respective heading above for more information and reference, and a full list of all precedential and informative decisions is available here.

[1] 358 F.3d 870, 885-86 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

[2] 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a).

Stephen Kunin Joins Maier & Maier PLLC

Maier & Maier

July 2, 2018 (Alexandria, VA) Maier & Maier PLLC is proud to announce its newest addition to the firm, Stephen Kunin, the former Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy at the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

As an expert in patent law for over 48 years, Mr. Kunin is a highly respected member of the patent industry. One of the masterminds of the revisions to the Rules of Practice and Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, Mr. Kunin worked over 3 decades at the U.S. Patent Office, serving his final ten years as Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examining Policy, and winning 9 Medals (4 Gold) from the Department of Commerce, a Career Achievement Award from the USPTO, and a Reinventing Government Hammer Award from the Vice President, among other notable distinctions.

Mr. Kunin brings with him an expert level of knowledge in every aspect of prosecution and post-issuance proceedings, a highly strategic thought leader on the tactical advantages of post-grant procedures in lieu of traditional litigation, and his continued specialty as a highly sought consultant and expert witness on all matters relating to USPTO patent policy, practice, and procedure.

Timothy Maier, Managing Partner of Maier & Maier, commented that “Stephen Kunin has a deep well of knowledge on patent issues, starting with his time at the Patent Office and continuing today. He’ll be an invaluable resource to our firm and his expertise will help us provide our clients with the best service possible.”

Introduction of New Patent Legislation in Congress Looms Over PTAB Litigation Practice

Maier & Maier

Two new pieces of legislation were introduced in the past few weeks, one each in the House and the Senate, and both could have drastic implications for PTAB practice. The PACED Act, introduced in the Senate, would eliminate Tribal Immunity as a defense for all Patent Owners in proceedings before the Patent Office. The STRONGER Patents Act, introduced to the House as the counter part to the previous iteration in the senate, would make a number of changes to patent enforcement, including the reversal of the Supreme Court by making the validity standard in the PTAB match the standard in District Court.

The PACED Act

The ongoing Allergan appeal in the Federal Circuit on Tribal Immunity in an IPR is the apparent inspiration for the PACED Act, which would explicitly remove Tribal Sovereign Immunity as an option for defense in IPR’s. The PACED (“Preserving Access to Cost Effective Drugs”) Act, introduced by Senator Tom Cotton, abrogates sovereign immunity in all derivations, reexams, IPRs, post-grant reviews, and in federal reviews of the aforementioned proceedings.[1]

Cotton makes the motivation behind the bill clear, explaining that “This bill will make sure unscrupulous patent holders can’t game the system and block their competitors from entering the market”[2] referring to the ongoing appeal by Saint Regis and Allergan described here. The bill seeks to remove Allergan’s strongest argument, that Sovereign Immunity exists unless the Tribe has waived it or congress has specifically permitted the suit, as outlined by the Supreme Court.[3]

It should be noted that the proposed bill specifically limits the scope of these exceptions to Sovereign Immunity, explicitly stating that “shall apply only to the extent permitted under the 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”

Whether the PACED Act successfully passes through the Senate and on to the House will be something to watch moving forward, though it is possible the Allergan appeal may resolve the issue without legislative intervention.

The STRONGER Patents Act

The STRONGER (“Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience”) Patents Act is the House version of the act introduced to the Senate with the same name last June, co-sponsored by senators Chris Coons, Tom Cotton, Mazie Hirono, and Dick Durbin. The House bill was introduced by the bipartisan duo of Steve Stivers and Bill Foster, and would represent the biggest overhaul of the U.S. patent system since the AIA in 2011[4].

Most of the notable changes proposed for the PTAB involve the relationship between the PTAB and federal District Court, with a goal of increasing efficiency and limiting litigation. Specifically, the bill would align the PTAB’s invalidity standards with the District Court’s, require the PTAB to consider District Court claim constructions along with prosecution history, and preclude institution if validity on § 102 or § 103 grounds had already been decided by a Federal Court or by the ITC.

Additional language weighing the scales in Patent Owners’ favor would require petitioners to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of being sued for infringement of the patent or competitive harm from the validity of the patent and allow Patent Owners access to an expedited amendment process before a patent examiner during IPR and PGR proceedings. Conversely, the bill would also empower the ITC and state attorneys to curb bad faith demand letters for misleading language about their right to enforce a patent against the recipient.

With the bill now being introduced in both houses of Congress by bipartisan sponsors, and gaining considerable support, it will be worth monitoring moving forward.

[1] https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s2514/text

[2] https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=901

[3] Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).

[4] https://stivers.house.gov/uploadedfiles/stronger_patents_act.pdf

Federal Circuit Extends §101 to Cover Graphical User Interfaces in Core Wireless v. LG

Maier & Maier

In Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2016-2684, 2017-1922 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 23, 2018), a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Moore, O’Malley, Wallach) upheld patent claims directed to a graphical user interface under 35 U.S.C. §101, concluding that the claims were not directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.

Core Wireless brought an action against LG in the Eastern District of Texas alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,713,476 and 8,434,020, having claims dealing with an application summary screen that is displayed while the one or more applications summarized are in an un-launched state. The District Court denied summary judgment based on 35 U.S.C. §101, and LG appealed.

The Federal Circuit began its analysis by determining that the claims of the two patents in question were directed to an “improved user interface,” a non-abstract idea, rather than the abstract idea of an index. Specifically, these claims were “directed to a particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices.” For example, claim 1 required “an application summary that can be reached directly from the menu” and further limiting the application summary (such as having the application summary list a limited set of data with each of the data in the list being selectable to launch the respective application and enable the selected data to be seen within the respective application) as well as a particular manner of accessing the summary window and certain other limitations.

The Court analogized the case to other cases in which a computer-implemented claim was found eligible, such as Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., Thales Visionix Inc. v. U.S., Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., and Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., specifically noting that the claims in each of these cases were found to improve a computer or technological system, and were thus not abstract. (Just like in many of these cases, the Court looked to the patent specifications in order to determine what aspects of a computer the claims were directed toward improving.)

Once the §101 matter was resolved, the Court also heard the issue of non-infringement. This turned, in large part, on the Court’s interpretation of the phrase “unlaunched state” in the claims, which LG had (unsuccessfully) argued in the District Court should refer to a situation in which the applications were “not running” rather than “not displayed.” LG argued that it would not infringe if the applications were required to be “not running.” The court (minus Judge Wallach, who dissented on this point) sided with the District Court, finding that the District Court correctly construed “unlaunched state” as “not displayed.”

Importantly, the claims in this case were considered to be an improvement to computer technology because they improved the ability of a user to use the computer. In order to use prior art systems, users had to “drill down through many layers to get to desired data or functionality [which] could seem slow, complex and difficult to learn, particularly to novice users,” while the claimed invention, by contrast, was much more user-friendly. This effectively adds “user-friendliness” or “usability” to the list of innovations which can be an improvement to computer technology, significantly expanding the list of patent-eligible subject matter.

It has also historically been a little unclear as to how graphical user interface designs can be protected by intellectual property rights. There is a circuit split between the Ninth Circuit and other circuits as to whether GUIs are copyrightable subject matter, and past Federal Circuit jurisprudence as to their patentability has come down on both sides of the line. However, the vast majority of cases (such as, for example, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), and Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.) have found GUIs to be ineligible, while the one case that upheld a GUI patent claim (Trading Technologies Int’l v. CQG Inc) was a non-precedential opinion that dealt with an extremely detailed claim. This case provides applicants with a clear model to follow for future applications on interface technology or any similar technology.

Updates in U.S. Patent Law, April 2017

Daniel Ehrlich

Federal Circuit Rules that Patent Holder Cannot Evade Patent Marking Statute with Retroactive Statutory Disclaimer

In Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 16-1729 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the Federal Circuit determined that a patent holder could not use a retroactive statutory disclaimer to avoid having to fully comply with the patent marking statute.
The relevant statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287, states that “[p]atentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is patented” by appropriately marking the patented article. The statute further provides that, “[i]n the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.”
Rembrandt had sued Samsung for infringement of a number of claims of two of its patents, US Patent Nos. 8,023,580 and 8,457,228. During the time period in which Samsung was allegedly infringing, Rembrandt had licensed the ‘580 patent to Zhone Technologies, which manufactured products embodying claim 40 of the patent, which was one of the claims Rembrandt had asserted in litigation. Zhone did not mark these products with the patent number.
Before trial, Samsung moved to limit Rembrandt’s damages on the grounds that Rembrandt did not comply with the marking statute (because the product manufactured by Zhone was not marked) and that Rembrandt was therefore not entitled to damages for infringement of any of the claims of the ‘580 patent for any time period before Samsung was notified of the infringement by the filing of the complaint. In response, Rembrandt withdrew claim 40 from its infringement allegations and filed a statutory disclaimer in the US Patent and Trademark Office to disclaim claim 40.
The District Court accepted Rembrandt’s argument that this statutory disclaimer removed its obligation to mark claim 40, for the reason that “a disclaimed patent claim is treated as if it never existed.” The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that such an interpretation defeated the purpose of the patent marking statute, because allowing Rembrandt to use a disclaimer to avoid the consequences of its failure undermined the public notice function of the marking statute.
However, the Federal Circuit noted that it has not been resolved whether the marking statute applies on a patent-by-patent basis or on a claim-by-claim basis, and the failure to mark claim 40 may limit only the award of damages based on claim 40. The Federal Circuit elected to remand the case for determination of this issue.

USPTO Design Day 2017

On April 25, 2017, the USPTO held its annual Design Day, a seminar featuring Examiners, Practitioners, and Industrial Designers, to discuss the latest developments in design patents.
Design Day 2017 opened with an introduction of Karen Young, the newly named Director of the Tech Center 2900, which is responsible for all design examination. Director Young shared several key statistics showing increasing interest in design patents. In fiscal year 2016, 40,406 design applications were filed, up from 36,889 in FY 2015. 20,361 applications have already been filed in FY 2017. The current backlog of unexamined applications is 44,578, resulting in a 12.9 month average pendency to first action and a 19.1 month average overall pendency for design applications. To keep up with the increased filings and work toward lowering the current backlog, 29 new design examiners were hired in June 2016, increasing the total number of design examiners to 187. However, over 100 of these examiners are still junior examiners without signatory power.  As a result, clear and consistent communication is critical for effect prosecution.
The day also included updates from speakers on international treaties, best prosecution practices, perspectives from in-house counsel and an industrial designer, case law updates, a discussion of design patents in the fashion industry, and a mock argument demonstrating the implications of prosecution history on the enforceability of design patents after issuance.
Please contact us if you are interested in additional information on particular topics covered at Design Day 2017 or if you have general inquiries regarding design filings in the U.S.

Supreme Court Says Components Can Be “Articles of Manufacture” For Calculating Total Profits

Timothy Maier

In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 580 U. S. ____ (2016), the Supreme Court reversed a damages award of approximately $399 million that had been granted to Apple by the trial court based on a “Total Profits” theory, and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration under its new standard.

In this case, Apple Inc. (“Apple”) had sued Samsung Electronics Co. (“Samsung”) for infringement of various utility and design patents covering its mobile phone technology. A jury found that Samsung infringed Apple’s design and utility patents and diluted Apple’s trade dresses. With regard to the design patent issues, the jury in the lower court case had based their award on a “total profits” calculation as called for by the statute, and awarded Apple approximately $399 million, representing Samsung’s entire profit from the sales of the smartphones that were found to be infringing.

With regard to the design patent issue, the relevant statute governing design patent damages (35 U.S.C. §289) provides that:

Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties.

Nothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or impeach any other remedy which an owner of an infringed patent has under the provisions of this title, but he shall not twice recover the profit made from the infringement.

Samsung appealed the verdict, including the findings of design patent infringement, utility patent infringement, and trade dress dilution, to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit affirmed the award. In relevant part, it concluded that §289 was applicable to the “total profit” of any infringing product incorporating the design feature, because the infringing product (and not just the infringing component) was what would be considered the “article of manufacture.”

However, today, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor stated that “the relevant ‘article of manufacture’ for arriving at a §289 damages award need not be the end product sold to the consumer but may be only a component of that product.” An “article of manufacture,” said the Court, was simply something that was made by hand or by machine, which encompassed both products sold to consumers and components of products sold to consumers.

The Supreme Court justified this decision as consistent with section 171(a) of the Patent Act, which permits “design[s] for an article of manufacture,” and which has long been interpreted by the US Patent and Trademark Office to be applicable to designs for features or components of products as well as complete products. Similarly, section 101 of the Patent Act authorizes patent protection for “any new and useful . . . manufacture,” and has likewise been interpreted to be applicable to features or components of products.

The Supreme Court did not elect to determine whether the “articles of manufacture” at issue in this case were the infringing smartphones or the infringing components or features of the smartphones. Instead, the Supreme Court left it for the Federal Circuit to craft a test for determining whether an “article of manufacture” in a particular case refers to a product sold to a consumer or to a particular component of that product, and to apply that test to determine whether the smartphones or smartphone components were the “article of manufacture.”

While a full analysis of the case’s effects on design patent law will depend on what test the Federal Circuit crafts to determine what is or is not an “article of manufacture,” the Court did strike down the broadest definition of an article of manufacture as necessarily being “the entire infringing product.” This means that, in a design patent litigation, a litigant can no longer automatically expect an award of “total profits” for the end product sold to consumers, and will have to prove entitlement to such an award. Meanwhile, defendants will have more ammunition that they can use in order to reduce the size of a design patent award.